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Abstract:
Developing countries that host mega-events such as the Olympic Games and
World Cup invest enormous sums in stadiums and collateral infrastructure projects. The
rapid investment in long-lasting physical stocks raises questions of equity and efficiency
for national taxpayers and event attendees. This paper reviews several cases of historical
and recent mega-events to assess the infrastructure costs, returns on infrastructure
investments, and impacts of the events on urban development patterns. It will highlight
cases where mega-event investments contributed to long-term economic growth.
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Introduction and Background
Sporting mega-events such as the Summer and Winter Olympic Games or
soccer’s World Cup focus the world’s attention on the region hosting the event and are
highly sought-after prizes. Indeed, the competition among cities and countries to host
these events is often as fierce as the competition on the playing field. Increasingly,
developing countries have thrown their names into the bidding process in an attempt to
chase after the riches and the glory that, presumably, accrue to the city where the games
will take place. However, with great events come great responsibilities, and the cost of
operating, organizing, and building infrastructure for an Olympic Games or World Cup
can be daunting. From an economic stand point, the question is whether mega-events
represent a good investment for developing countries, and it is this question that will be
addressed in this chapter.
The modern Summer Olympic Games began in 1896 and take place every four
years at new locations selected through an elaborate bidding process many years in
advance of the event. The Winter Olympics, held since 1924, follow an identical
procedure. In recent times, the host city for both the Summer and Winter Games has been
selected six or seven years before the event is to take place. Historically, hosting the
Olympic Games has been almost exclusively the domain of rich, industrialized nations.
Between 1896 and 1952, every Summer and Winter Games was held in either Western
Europe or the U.S. with cities in Japan, Canada, and Australia joining the mix over the
next two decades (as shown in Table 1). Mexico City in 1968 was the first location
outside the industrialized world in which the Games were held. Eastern European
countries were awarded the Summer Games in 1980 (Moscow) and Winter Games in
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1984 (Sarajevo, Yugoslavia). Seoul, Korea was awarded the 1988 Summer Games, a time
during which South Korea might be classified as “rapidly industrializing” rather than
industrialized, but it is probably fair to note that shortly after the Olympics, the country
was admitted to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD),
a sort of de facto dividing line between industrialized and developing nations.
More recently, however, the International Olympic Committee (IOC) has
encouraged bids from poorer countries and has awarded the Games on several occasions
to non-traditional countries outside of the OECD. The 2008 Summer Games were hosted
by China, and the 2016 Summer Olympics will be played in Rio de Janeiro, the first time
the event has taken place in the South America, while the 2014 Winter Olympics will
take place in Sochi, Russia, leaving Western Europe, North America, and Japan, for only
the second time. As seen in Table 2, the list of countries submitting formal bids has also
dramatically changed in recent decades. Twenty percent of the bids submitted for the
Summer Games prior to 2000 came from outside of Western Europe, Japan, Australia,
Canada, and the US. Since 2000, however, over half of all bids have come from this
group including applications by Istanbul, Bangkok, Havana, Buenos Aires, and Cape
Town, among others, plus, of course, the successful bids by Beijing and Rio. On the
Winter Olympics side, the past decade has witnessed bids from Kazakhstan, Georgia,
China, Slovakia, and Poland for the first time.
The world’s other major international mega-sporting event is the Fédération
Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) World Cup. Like the Olympics, this event
takes place every four years and features soccer teams composed of players grouped by
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nationality ( i.e. “national teams”). The World Cup2 began in 1930 in response to soccer’s
growing prominence in the Olympics. Due to the number of large stadiums required to
accommodate the tournament, FIFA selects a host country for the event as opposed to the
IOC’s tradition of choosing a single host city. As again shown in Table 1, for the first 60
years of the competition, the World Cup essentially alternated between the two centers of
soccer interest, Europe and Latin America, so unlike the Olympics, numerous countries
in Central and South America have hosted the World Cup including Uruguay, Brazil,
Chile, Argentina, and Mexico.
This rotation scheme lasted until 1994 when FIFA, in an attempt to expand world
interest in the game, awarded the World Cup to the US, a huge untapped market for the
sport. Japan and South Korea followed in 2002, the first tournament co-hosted by two
countries and the first World Cup played in Asia. More “firsts” followed in the wake of
the US, Japan, and South Korea. South Africa became the first African host in 2010,
Russia becomes the first Eastern European host in 2018, and Qatar, a nation with no
domestic soccer league and little soccer history or tradition, will become the first Middle
Eastern host in 2022. In 2014, the World Cup returns to a Latin American country for the
first time in nearly 30 years when Brazil will host the event.
It is interesting to note that economically, the world’s attention has increasingly
shifted from the so-called G-7 nations, which include the world’s largest industrialized
economies such as the US, Japan, UK, and Germany, to the BRICS nations, an acronym
for the five rapidly developing nations of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa.

2

Other international sporting organizations, notably in Cricket and Rugby, also host similar international
tournaments that are dubbed “the World Cup.” These events are typically smaller than the FIFA World
Cup, and for the purposes of this paper, the term “World Cup” is meant to describe the soccer tournament
unless specifically noted otherwise.
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When one includes the 2010 Commonwealth Games hosted by India, on the world’s
sports stage, each of these countries will have held at least one of the world’s top sporting
events between 2008 and 2018.
The shift to a more egalitarian system of awarding mega-events to non-traditional
hosts has it proponents. Supporters of South Africa’s failed bid to host the 2006 World
Cup were bitterly disappointed with the controversial decision that instead designated
Germany as the host nation. With the growing interest in soccer throughout Africa, it was
thought that the continent deserved its own chance to host the tournament. However, an
in-depth analysis of both the short-run and long-run economic impact of hosting megaevents demonstrates that in a direct economic sense, the World Cup is more of a poisoned
chalice. Similarly, the Olympics often prove to be an expensive burden providing a shortrun economic boost well below what the event’s proponents typically predict and few
long-run economic benefits.

Short-run costs and benefits
It is undeniable that mega-events result in significant tourism expenditures, but in
the vast majority of cases the observed increases in economic activity fall well short of
the economic impact predicted by event organizers. Focusing just on the Olympics and
World Cup, Table 3 shows commissioned ex ante economic impact studies for various
Olympics and World Cups. Table 4 shows ex post estimates of economic impact
performed by economists not associated with the events for various Olympics and World
Cups examining actual economic data before, during, and after the events. In the majority
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of cases, independent economists find little or no direct economic impact of mega-events
on host economies.
The disconnect between ex ante predictions and ex post reality comes as a result
of numerous factors. As numerous authors including Matheson (2008), economic impact
studies may be based on inflated, unrealistic, or best-case predictions, but even when
appropriate data are used, many economic impact estimates regularly suffer from several
features that serve to exaggerate the numbers. First, to the extent a sporting event attracts
spectators from the local community, any money spent by these fans is money not being
spent by these residents elsewhere in the local economy. Spending by local citizens does
not represent new money in the economy but is rather simply money that is reallocated
within the city or country. While crowds of local fans filling up the stadiums cheering for
the home team makes for a festive atmosphere, it does little to encourage new spending in
the economy or promote economic growth.
Second, money spent in a local economy during a mega-event may not stick in the
local economy. Mega-events are frequently characterized by capacity constraints and
high prices for items such as accommodations. Hotel rooms can frequently sell at three or
four time their normal rates during mega-events, but the desk clerks and room cleaners
who service these establishments will not generally see their wages triple or quadruple.
Thus, the tourist industry should see an increase in returns to capital, and to the extent
hotels or other service industries are owned by individuals outside the local economy,
spending at the event leaks out of the host economy.
Third, sports fans can crowd out regular visitors displacing economic activity that
would have occurred in the absence of the sporting event. While a city’s hotels and
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restaurants may be full of sports fans during a tournament, if those same hotel rooms and
restaurants would have been full of business travelers or other vacationers in the absence
of the mega-event, then the tournament has not resulted in a net increase in economic
activity. Yogi Berra’s famous quote, “no one goes there anymore, it’s too crowded,”
while nonsensical on the surface, has a strong element of truth to it when applied to
tourism and mega-events.
An examination of tourist arrivals in South Africa around the time of the 2010
World Cup is illustrative of these issues. The 64 games of the tournament attracted an
average of 49,670 spectators per match for a total of nearly 3.2 million fans. As noted
previously, only foreign visitors should be included in any economic impact estimates
and many fans are likely to attend more than one game, so the number of persons that
should be included in any impact figures is likely to be significantly below 3.2 million.
The consulting firm Grant Thornton South Africa initially predicted 483,000 international
visitors for the 2010 FIFA World Cup in South Africa, later revising their figures
downward to 373,000 international visitors. Even this number turned out to be too
optimistic, as FIFA reported that just “309,554 foreign tourists arrived in South Africa for
the primary purpose of attending the 2010 FIFA World Cup” and that they spent 3.64
billion rand during their stay (FIFA, 2010). Thus, the substitution effect combined with
overly rosy attendance figures reduced 3.2 million fans in the stadiums to just 310
thousand actual overseas visitors.
The bad news for South Africa does not stop there. Total tourist arrivals in June
and July 2010 were only 273 thousand above the same months the year before suggesting
a degree of crowding out. Furthermore, 2009 was a particular poor year for tourism to
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South Africa due to the worldwide economic crisis. Econometric analysis of tourist
arrivals suggests an increase of only 123 to 202 thousand above what would have been
expected with the World Cup. (Matheson, Peeters, and Syzmanski, 2012). These visitor
numbers are unlikely to be sufficient to cover the high costs of putting on a mega-event
of this magnitude. South Africa’s experience is far from unique. Beijing reported total
visitor numbers in August 2008 during the Summer Olympics similar to those in the same
month during the previous year, and shops, restaurants and tourist attractions outside of
the areas immediately adjacent to the Olympic venues in London reported a tourist
drought during the 2012 Summer Games (CBC, 2012).

Short-run costs
Hosting mega-events can be an enormously expensive affair and governing bodies
such as the IOC and FIFA typically require that the majority of the costs be borne by the
host country. The Olympics require a large amount of very specific sports infrastructure
in order to accommodate the range of events. For the World Cup, FIFA requires host
countries to have at least 12 modern stadiums capable of seating at least 40,000
spectators with one of the stadiums being able to seat at least 80,000 for the opener and
the final. Operating costs can often entail heavy expenditures in large part due to the
extensive security requirements that mega-events require. The security budget alone for
the Athens Olympics of 2004 ran to over $1.5 billion, nearly 6 times the budget for the
Sydney Games just 4 years earlier. The 2010 FIFA World Cup entailed $3.9 billion in
expenses borne by South Africa, including at least $1.3 billion in stadium construction
costs (Voigt, 2010; Baade and Matheson, 2012). Costs for Brazil’s 2014 World Cup are
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currently unknown but somewhere well in excess of $10 billion. As is common in
sporting events, costs have escalated drastically in just a few short years.
“Back in 2009, the Brazilian Football Confederation estimated the 12 stadiums
being refitted or built for the World Cup would cost about 2.2 billion reais – a
figure that two years later seems quaint. The government now sees them costing
more than triple that, at 6.9 billion reais.” (Grudgings, 2011)

Table 4 shows the sports infrastructure, non-sports infrastructure, and operational
spending for various recent mega-events. Full information is not available for all events.
Sports infrastructure includes spending on stadiums and sports venues while non-sport
infrastructure includes construction costs for transportation, tourist and athlete
accommodations, and public spaces. It is important to note that the dividing line between
sports infrastructure and non-sports infrastructure is not entirely clear. For example, 20%
of the total budgeted cost for London’s new Wembley Stadium was $150 million in
general infrastructure improvements including a new roads and a renovated Underground
station designed to better accommodate stadium traffic. While the roads and subway
station are clearly not a part of the stadium, without the stadium, the roads and station
would not be required. (Matheson, 2008) It is also worth noting that the entire Wembley
project, which will play a significant role in the 2012 London Summer Games, ended up
costing 798 million pounds (2007) over twice its original budget, yet another example of
optimistic accounting in sporting events.
Given the huge costs associated with mega-events and the relatively small number
of visitors, it is virtually impossible for the direct revenues associated with these events to
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cover their expenses. This is less true if little in the way of new infrastructure needs to be
built. For example, total infrastructure costs for the 1994 World Cup held in the US were
only $30 million as the existing stadiums in the country were more than adequate for the
event. Similarly, the 1984 Summer Games in Los Angeles made a large profit for the
organizers, again because existing facilities were used for most events. Given the huge
increases in security that have arisen in the post 9/11 world, however, it is uncertain that
even with no capital outlays that a mega-event would have short-run net benefits for the
host. Thus, economic rationality rests on the legacy effects of the events in terms of
branding or economic growth based on infrastructure legacies.

Long-run benefits
While the short-run tourism boost that mega-events provide are clearly limited
especially in relation to the large expenses involved, typically event organizers claim that
mega-events result in a lasting legacy that will provide significant economic benefits for
many years to come. Just as the short-run benefits of mega-events are overblown, so too
are the claims of long-run benefits from sports infrastructure.
It is often claimed that stadiums and sports facilities can serve as an anchor to
promote local economic development. Supporters envision stadiums serving as an
integrated component of a thriving and diverse local economy. One example of this
economic model is the Wrigleyville neighborhood on the north side of Chicago, home to
Major League Baseball’s Chicago Cubs. Wrigley Field, the second oldest major league
sports stadium in the US behind only Boston’s venerable Fenway Park, was built in 1914
and rests comfortably within the existing street grid. The Cubs generate significant
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spillover effects for the surrounding community by attracting sports fans to area. The 81game season brings into the local neighborhood roughly 3 million baseball fans who
frequent bars, restaurants, and souvenir shops both before and after home games. Figure 1
clearly shows how the Wrigley Field serves to promote local businesses. A thriving
entertainment district has grown up around the stadium, and dozens of eating and
drinking establishments can be seen within just a few blocks of the Cubs’ home.
Unfortunately for proponents of sports-based economic development, Wrigley
Field is the exception rather than the rule. Just 10 miles south of Wrigley is US Cellular
Park, home of the Chicago White Sox, Chicago’s other Major League Baseball team.
Built in 1992 to replace the aging Comisky Park, US Cellular is more in line with most
modern stadiums that are designed to maximize in-stadium revenue. As exemplified by
US Cellular Park (shown in Figure 2), in many cases the modern stadium is best seen as a
walled fortress with a moat of parking lots driving fans inside the castle and away from
the barbarian hoards of shops and businesses in the local neighborhood. Indeed, the
overwhelming evidence from economists studying the economic benefits of new
stadiums on local economies have found little or no positive impact on metropolitan area
economies (Coates and Humphreys, 1999; 2008; Baade, 1996), although neighborhood
effects are evident in some cases (Tu 2005; Feng and Humphreys, 2008).
Most studies of stadium economics have examined facilities in the US and to a
lesser extent in Europe, but if the economics are poor for facilities in the industrialized
world, their prospects are even worse in developing countries. Rich countries usually
have well-developed professional sports leagues meaning that in many cases existing
sports infrastructure can be utilized, and many new facilities can find productive uses
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after the event. For example, currently all 12 of the stadiums used in Germany in the
2006 World Cup are regularly filled to capacity by the Bundesliga soccer teams that have
become full-time tenants. In contrast, the South African Premier Soccer League averages
only 7,500 fans per match, hardly the crowds for which the World Cup stadiums were
designed. Other events at South African stadiums have rarely filled the venues. Atlanta’s
newly constructed Centennial Olympic Stadium was renovated after the 1996 Games and
is currently home to Major League Baseball’s Atlanta Braves while the Beijing National
Stadium (better known as the “Bird’s Nest”) sits largely unused.
Without regular, well-attended events at the newly constructed sports facilities,
the stadiums are unlikely to give rise to urban development in their local neighborhoods.
Indeed, an overhead image (Figure 3) of the area in Beijing around the Bird’s Nest and
the National Aquatic Center (or “Water Cube”) shows a beautifully landscaped area but
little in the way of automobile or pedestrian traffic and few new businesses. Similarly, a
view of Soccer City (Figure 4) on the outskirts of Johannesburg, South Africa, the site of
the 2010 World Cup Final, shows a string of administrative buildings next to the stadium
but little else. For the most part, new stadiums in developing countries mirror the
experience of Chicago’s US Cellular Park not the more development friendly Wrigley
Field.
Sports facilities are generally quite difficult to convert to other uses. Housing for
athletes or officials can be easily converted to residential facilities for students or other
residents as was done in Atlanta following the 1996 Summer Olympics and in Los
Angeles in 1984. Such conversions are rare, however, for athletic venues. The famous
“Water Cube” in Beijing, home of most of the aquatic events in the 2008 Summer
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Games, was opened for public swimming in the year after the Olympics making it the
world’s most expensive lap pool. It subsequently underwent significant renovations and
reopened as a large water park. While that is fine long-term use for an otherwise
underutilized venue, it is also an extraordinarily expensive way to build a water park.
If the creation of new or improved sports infrastructure cannot be seen as a savior
for mega-events, then one is left to appeal to the creation of non-sports infrastructure as
an economic justification for hosting mega-events. As can be seen in Table 4, non-sports
related infrastructure expenditures often exceed the spending on sports venues by a wide
margin, and unlike sports venues, expenditures on transportation networks and other
types of general infrastructure have the potential to encourage future growth. Megaevents can serve as an impetus to engage in needed infrastructure investments that don’t
get done due to a lack of political will. Brazil, for example, is engaging in massive
investment spending in its run up to the 2014 World Cup and 2016 Summer Olympics.
The words of Brazilian Football Confederation President Ricardo Teixeira echo those of
many proponents of mega-events.
"We are a civilized nation, a nation that is going through an excellent
phase, and we have got everything prepared to receive adequately the
honor to organize an excellent World Cup. Over the next few years we
will have a consistent influx of investments. The 2014 World Cup will
enable Brazil to have a modern infrastructure. In social terms it will be
very beneficial.… Our objective is to make Brazil become more visible in
global arenas. The World Cup goes far beyond a mere sporting event. It’s
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going to be an interesting tool to promote social transformation.” (CNN,
2007)

There is an element of truth to Teixeira’s words; however, two caveats are
in order. First, spending millions or billions of dollars in unproductive sports
infrastructure simply in order to have the political will to make needed
infrastructure investments is a distinctly second-best economic strategy. Public
capital would be more efficiently allocated if governments would simply make
reasonable public investment choices without a mega-event hanging over their
heads. In addition, mega-events can place surprising tight deadlines on major
public works projects. These deadlines can serve to raise costs due to rushed
schedules, relaxed bidding rules, and potential corruption. Finally, it should be
noted that preparations for a mega-event can result in too high a level of
investment in non-athletic infrastructure. An airport, transportation network, or
number of hotel rooms that is the right size for three weeks of tourist insanity may
be extensively overbuilt for the post-event period. For example, two major luxury
hotels built for the 1994 Winter Olympics in Lillehammer, Norway, filed for
bankruptcy shortly after the close of the Games.
The final potential benefit of mega-events is that they can serve to “put the
host on the map” leading to higher levels of future tourism, trade, and investment.
As noted by Matheson (2008),
The other major intangible benefit of mega-events claimed by
sports boosters is that of national and international exposure. Sports fans
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may enjoy their visit to the city and return later raising future tourist
revenues for the area. Corporate visitors, it is claimed, may relocate
manufacturing facilities and company headquarters to the city. Television
viewers might decide to take a trip to the host city at some time in the
future based on what they see during the broadcast of the mega-event.
Finally, hosting a major event might raise perceptions of the city so that it
becomes a “world class” city and travel destination. All of these claims are
potential true although little empirical research has conclusively
demonstrated any long-run connections between hosting mega-events and
future tourism demand. There are not even any anecdotal examples of
companies moving corporate operations to a city based on the hosting of a
sporting event.

There are individual cases where mega-events do seem to have major
influence on future demand, but it appears that a “perfect storm” is needed. Cities
that are already on everyone’s map, London for example, gain little in exposure
from a major event since they are already at nearly maximum exposure. Other
cities such as Atlanta or many Winter Olympics hosts also gain little from
exposure because the cities have little to offer potential tourists. Advertising
without a subject to advertise is largely ineffective. In a perfect situation, a
“hidden gem” can raise its international profile with the right situation. This
appears to have been the case with Barcelona, a city with great artistic, cultural,
and architectural treasures, but also a city long overshadowed by European
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capitals such as Madrid, Rome, London, and Paris, as well as 40 years of fascist
rule. By 2012, twenty years after their moment on the world stage, Barcelona was
the fourth most visited city in Europe. Barcelona’s tourism experience, however,
has not been replicated in the majority of Olympic hosts.
Rose and Spiegel (2010) find that international trade increases
significantly when a country hosts a major event. Typically, this would lend
strong evidence to the idea that the Olympics or World Cup has a large
advertising effect, but the authors also find that simply the act of bidding for the
Olympics serves to increase capital inflows. They chalk this up to a signaling
effect that bidding for the Olympics lets other countries know that the nation is
“open for business.” If Rose and Spiegel’s finding are truly more than spurious
correlation, the findings of other economists suggest that an optimal strategy
would be bid for the Olympics but not win them. Subsequent analysis of foreign
trade flow, however, indeed suggests that Rose and Spiegel’s findings are likely
the result of selection bias. Countries that are in the position to bid for the
Olympics are typically the sort of rich, growing countries that generally
experience trade growth. When Olympic hosts and bidders are compared to
otherwise similar countries that did not bid for the Games, the so-called “Olympic
Effect” disappears (Maennig and Richter, 2012).
It should also be noted that the presence of a mega-event may bring with it
intangible costs as well as benefits. For example, the publicity associated with a
sporting event may not always place a city in a positive light. The bribery scandal
that surrounded the 2002 Winter Olympics in Salt Lake City certainly didn’t
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enhance the city’s reputation. Similarly, the international reputations of Munich
and Atlanta were tarnished by the terrorist events that occurred during the
Olympic Games held in their respective cities.
Of course, the use of sporting events to provide entertainment for the masses has
been around for centuries. The term “bread and circuses” dates from the first century
Roman empire where extravagant games were held in conjunction with giveaways of
subsidized food in order to pacify the citizenry and reduce urban unrest. Sports boosters
also often cite civic pride or national exposure as a primary benefit of mega-events and of
sports in general. In many cases, it is undoubtedly true that mega-events bring intangible
psychological value to the communities that host them. The 1995 Rugby World Cup in
South Africa represented an opportunity for the country to announce its re-emergence as
a full member of not only the world’s sporting community but also its political
community. The picture of South African President Nelson Mandela wearing the jersey
of the white South African captain Francois Pienaar while presenting him with the
championship trophy was a powerful image to the world indicating that South Africa had
emerged from its years of racial oppression and served to unify the country (Baade and
Matheson, 2004a). Similarly, Ray Nagin, the mayor of New Orleans, pointed to the return
of the NFL to the city in September 2006 as an important symbol to the rest of the
country that the city was fully on the road to recovery from Hurricane Katrina which had
devastated the city the year previously. Allmers and Maennig (2009) also found that the
largest identifiable effect from the 2006 World Cup in Germany was a clear increase in
self-reported happiness among German residents, a “feel-good” effect.
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Conclusion
Empirical research into the true economic impact of mega-events on host
economies tends to show that major sporting events bring high costs with low rewards.
The return to mega-events in developing nations may be even lower. Probably the best
that can be said for mega-events is that they allow governments to overcome political
constraints to allow beneficial infrastructure investments to be made. However,
overcoming these political constraints comes at a very high cost in terms of money spent
on unproductive investments in sport infrastructure and tournament operations, and there
is also no guarantee that any all general infrastructure investments will provide a net
positive return for the cities involved.
While the recent trend has been to “reward” developing countries with the
opportunity to host mega-events such as the World Cup and the Olympics, the empirical
evidence suggests that if rich countries want to promote economic development in poor
countries, it would make more sense for high-income nations to explicitly keep these
events out of the developing world and instead continue to award the games to rich
countries that are better able to absorb more of the associated costs than low-income
countries. Alternatively, the industrialized world could subsidize these events when they
are held in poor countries through sponsorship or by direct foreign assistance although
seems unlikely that rich countries would be willing to subsidize poor countries’ hosting
efforts when the two are often in direct competition with one another for the rights to host
in the first place.
It remains a widespread belief among countries that there are substantial national
gains to be made from hosting these global events, but the evidence indicates that this is
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rarely the case. Samuel Johnson once wrote that second marriages reflect “the triumph of
hope over experience.” Such thinking also pervades the vigorous competition among
countries to host these exciting but economically questionable events.
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Figure 1: Wrigley Field

Source: Baade, Matheson, and Nikolova (2007). Reprinted courtesy of
Geographische Rundschau International Edition.
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Figure 2: US Cellular Park

Source: Baade, Matheson, and Nikolova (2007). Reprinted courtesy of Geographische
Rundschau International Edition.
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Figure 3: “Bird’s Nest,” “Water Cube,” and Olympics Sports Center in Beijing

Image source: Astrium GEO-Information Services
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Figure 4: “Soccer City” near Johannesburg

Image source: Astrium GEO-Information Services
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Table 1: Hosts of the Summer and Winter Olympic Games and FIFA World Cup
Year
1896
1900
1904
1908
1912
1916
1920
1924
1928
1930
1932
1934
1936
1938
1940
1942
1944
1946
1948
1950
1952
1954
1956
1958
1960
1962
1964
1966
1968
1970
1972
1974
1976
1978
1980
1982
1984

Summer Olympics
Athens
Paris
St. Louis, USA
London
Stockholm
Not held
Antwerp
Paris
Amsterdam

Winter Olympics
Not held
Not held
Not held
Not held
Not held
Not held
Not held
Chamonix, France
St. Moritz, Switzerland

World Cup

Uruguay
Los Angeles

Lake Placid, USA
Italy

Berlin, Germany

Garmisch, Germany
France

Not held

Not held
Not held

Not held

Not held
Not held

London

St. Moritz, Switzerland
Brazil

Helsinki

Olso, Norway
Switzerland

Melbourne

Cortina, Italy
Sweden

Rome

Squaw Valley, USA
Chile

Tokyo

Innsbruck, Austria
England

Mexico City

Grenoble, France
Mexico

Munich

Sapporo, Japan
Germany

Montreal

Innsbruck, Austria
Argentina

Moscow

Lake Placid, USA
Spain

Los Angeles

Sarajevo, Yugoslavia
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1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010
2012
2014
2016
2018
2022

Mexico
Seoul

Calgary, Canada
Italy

Barcelona

Albertville, France
Lillehammer, Norway

USA

Nagano, Japan

France

Salt Lake City, USA

South Korea/Japan

Turin, Italy

Germany

Vancouver, Canada

South Africa

Sochi, Russia

Brazil

Atlanta
Sydney
Athens
Beijing
London
Rio de Janiero
Russia
Qatar
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Table 2: Summer and Winter Olympic Games bids
Event

Summer Olympics:
1896-1996
Summer Olympics:
2000-2016
Winter Olympics:
1924-1998
Winter Olympics:
2002-2014

Bids from
industrialized
countries
71 (82%)

Bids from
developing
countries
9 (10%)

21 (49%)

19 (44%)

3 (7%)

51 (93%)

1 (2%)

3 (5%)

18 (56%)

3 (9%)

11 (34%)
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Bids from Eastern
Bloc or former
Soviet states
7 (8%)

Table 3: Examples of Mega-Event ex ante Economic Impact Studies
Event

Year

Impact

World Cup (Japan)

2002

$24.8 billion

World Cup (South Korea)

2002

$8.9 billion

World Cup (South Africa)

2010

World Cup (South Africa)

2010

Summer Olympics (Atlanta)

1996

Winter Olympics (Vancouver, BC)

2010

$7.5 billion
198,400 jobs
$12 billion
483,000 visitors
$5.1 billion
77,000 jobs
$10.7C billion
244,000 jobs
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Source
Dentsu Institute for Human Studies,
Finer (2002)
Dentsu Institute for Human Studies,
Finer (2002)
Grant Thornton SA, Rihlamvu (2011)
Grant Thornton SA, Voigt (2010)
Humphreys and Plummer (2005)
InterVISTAS Consulting (2002)

Table 4 Examples of Mega-Event ex post Economic Impact Studies
Event
Summer Olympics
(Atlanta)
Summer Olympics
(Atlanta)

Years

Variable

Impact

1996

Employment

3,500 - 42,000 jobs

1996

Employment

Approx. 75,000

Winter Olympics

2002

Employment

Winter Olympics

2002

Retail Sales

World Cup

1994

Employment

World Cup

2006

Employment

Not statistically
significant

World Cup

1994

Personal Income

down $4 billion

World Cup

2006

Personal Income

World Cup

2006

Employment
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Positive, hotels
Negative, retailers

Not statistically
significant
Not statistically
significant

Source
Baade and Matheson
(2002)
Feddersen and Maennig
(2012)
Baumann, Engelhardt,
and Matheson (2012a)
Baade, Baumann and
Matheson (2010)
Baumann, Engelhardt,
and Matheson (2012b)
Allmers and Maennig
(2009)
Baade and Matheson
(2004)
Allmers and Maennig
(2009)
Allmers and Maennig
(2009)

Table 5: Costs of Hosting Mega-Events
Event
Summer Olympics
(Seoul)
Summer Olympics
(Barcelona)
Summer Olympics
(Atlanta)
Summer Olympics
(Sydney)

Years
1988
1992
1996
2000

Type
Sports Infrastructure
General Infrastructure
Sports Infrastructure
General Infrastructure
Sports Infrastructure
General Infrastructure
Sports Infrastructure
General Infrastructure
Sports Infrastructure
General Infrastructure
Operations

Spending
(millions, $’11)
$2,856
$4,870
$1,731
$14,517
$798
$999
$1,672
$1,725

Summer Olympics
(Athens)

2004

Summer Olympics
(Beijing)

2008

Sports Infrastructure
Total Spending (est.)

2012

Total Cost

$15,000 - $20,000

1998

Total Cost

Over $14,000

2006

Total Cost

$4,100

2010

Total Cost

C$5,900

Winter Olympics
(Sochi, Russia)

2014

Sports Infrastructure
General Infrastructure
Operations

World Cup (Japan
/South Korea)

2002

Sports Infrastructure

$2,000 (S. Korea)
$4,000-$5,600
(Japan)

2006

Sports Infrastructure

$1,870

Summer Olympics
(London)
Winter Olympics
(Nagano)
Winter Olympics
(Turin)
Winter Olympics
(Vancouver)

World Cup
(Germany)
World Cup (South
Africa)
World Cup (Brazil)
World Cup
(Russia)
World Cup (Japan
/South Korea)

Preuss (2008)
Preuss (2008)

$1,758
$45,000

Preuss (2008)
Baade and Matheson
(2012)

$10,000
(estimated)

2018

Total

$10,000 (est.)

2002

Sports Infrastructure
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Preuss (2008)

Preuss (2008)

$1,300
$3,900
$3,680
$13,000 (est.)

2014

Preuss (2008)

$13,813

Sports Infrastructure
Total
Sports Infrastructure
General Infrastructure

2010

Source

$2,000 (S. Korea)
$4-$5,600 (Japan)

Burns (2012)
Longman (1998)
Payne (2008)
Economist (2011)
Estimates, very
preliminary
Sloan (2002)

Downie (2012)
(Voigt, 2010; Baade
and Matheson, 2011).
Downie (2012)
Estimates, very
preliminary
(Sloan, 2002)

